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ABSTRACT: Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the 
distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory 
countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical 
categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are 
unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done 
without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the full expressive power of 
first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Furthermore, 
having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely 
a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms 
logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether 
we countenance certain terms as logical. 
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First-order logic has greater scope​ ​than propositional logic - it recognizes all the valid forms that 
propositional logic recognises, and more besides. But what determines the scope of (a) logic? 
Some have said that the scope of (a) logic is determined by which terms are (counted as) logical 
constants.  Some examples: 1
 
The choice of logical constants determines which sentences are counted as logical truths. 
(Warmbrōd (1999), p. 504.) 
 
It is clear that an answer to the question "What is a logical constant?" would provide us 
with the means to answer the question "Where are the limits of logic?" (Došen (1989), p. 
362.) 
 
Philosophically, my goal has been to find out what distinguishes logical from nonlogical 
terms, and, on this basis, determine the scope of (core) logic. (Sher (1991), p. 4.) 
 
At least under most views, logic is concerned only with certain kinds of correct 
arguments, and in fact only with arguments whose correctness is due to the peculiar 
properties of the expressions in a certain set. (...) In the most general, least theory-laden 
conception of it that seems possible, the problem of logical constants is the problem of 
demarcating in some principle-based, non-arbitrary-looking way the set of expressions 
that logic should deal with as directly responsible for the logical correctness of arguments 
(…). (Gómez-Torrente (2002), p. 2.) 
1 The parentheses are there because I want to stay neutral on, to use the terminology of Sagi (2014), the issue of 
‘principled’ vs. ‘relativistic’ accounts of the scope of logic. 
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Some have even suggested that we need logical terms in order to do logic at all: 
 
For if no terms are designated as logical constants, logic will lose the generality that 
comes with the ability to isolate and study argument forms. (Hanson (1997), p. 376.) 
 
All parties agree that permitting all expressions to have variable interpretations makes 
formal treatments of validity impossible, since no argument form would preserve truth 
under all interpretations of the logical “constants”, and all agree that permitting no 
expressions to have variable interpretations does not allow for multiple instances of a 
given logical form, thus precluding the study of ​formal​ logic. Hence, all agree on the 
need for logically relevant constants. (Bueno & Shalkowski (2013), p. 2.) 
 
But there are logically correct - i.e. formally valid - arguments whose logical correctness does 
not depend on the meanings of logical terms. Which argument forms are countenanced in a 
logical theory does not depend only on which (if any) logical terms are present in the language of 
the theory. And the problem of the scope of (a) logic does not reduce to the problem of 
demarcating the logical terms. 
 
These points have been obscured by certain historical developments. For instance, the popular 
Bolzano-Tarski  explication of logical consequence, which in effect takes a language as given 2
and then raises the issue of which expressions in that language count as logical, tends to obscure 
2 See Tarski (1936/1956). 
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the fact that decisions affecting the scope of a logic may have already been made by the time the 
language has been determined. Also, it happens to be the case that in the most common 
presentations of the most common types of logic - classical propositional and first-order logic - 
all valid forms, except the identity inference (from A infer A) , involve logical terms. 3
 
There are deeper, but still contingent, reasons for logical terms playing such a prominent role in 
the study of logic, having to do with the way human beings are trained or constituted. As 
Ramsey noted long ago: 
 
We might, for instance, express negation not by inserting a word "not", but by writing 
what we negate upside down. Such a symbolism is only inconvenient because we are not 
trained to perceive complicated symmetry about a horizontal axis [...]. (Ramsey (1927), 
pp. 161 - 162.) 
 
Gil Sagi and Alexandra Zinke are two recent authors who have argued that the scope of (a) logic 
is not always a matter of logical terms. Sagi (2014) develops a formal theory of ‘semantic 
constraints’ on a language, designed to offer a way of theorizing about logical form more general 
and flexible than focusing only on the issue of logical vs. extra-logical terms. Zinke (2018) notes 
- in passing, really - that propositional logic can be done without logical terms, and that therefore 
the logical/extra-logical distinction outruns the distinction between logical and extra-logical 
terms​. (However, we will see that Zinke treats this as little more than a “strictly speaking” sort of 
point, and - in my view at least - pulls back from appreciating its full significance.) 
3 ​Thanks to an anonymous referee for another journal for pointing out to me the need for this exception. 
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It is the purpose of this paper to further develop these insights. First, I extend Zinke’s technique 
for avoiding logical terms in propositional logic to first-order logic with identity. Second, I 
consider the case of adverbs, which highlights the importance of not letting the issue of logical 
termhood hog the limelight by making it clear that it is not even ​contingently​ the case that issues 
about (a) logic’s scope generally appear as issues about logical termhood. 
 
Zinke (2018, p. 133 - 134) notes that we can do propositional logic without having any terms for 
truth-functions. It is well known that there are two binary connectives, the Sheffer stroke and the 
Peirce dagger, both of which are functionally complete all by themselves. Zinke points out that if 
we only have one connective, we might as well omit it: to form a truth-functional compound, we 
could just write two sentences next to each other, using brackets as usual for scope distinctions. 
She writes: 
 
In such a language, there are no logical constants in the narrow sense, i.e., there are no 
elements of the alphabet which are classified as logical. The only logical notion there is, 
is not represented by a sign of the alphabet, but by the particular way the terms are 
arranged. (Zinke (2018), p. 134.) 
 
Lest it be thought that this is a trick which stops working in a less basic setting, it is worth noting 
that we do not need to stop at propositional logic.  We can without much trouble devise a 4
4 The ideas which follow were arrived at independently; thanks to an anonymous referee for another journal for 
making me aware that Zinke (2018), after quoting Ramsey’s remark about negation quoted above, anticipated the 
propositional part. 
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language with the full expressive power of standard first-order languages which is free of logical 
terms. Contemporary presentations of first-order logic typically involve two or three kinds of 
logical terms: propositional connectives, one or two quantifier symbols, and perhaps an identity 
predicate. As we just saw, we don’t need propositional connectives. Secondly, we don’t need a 
special quantifier symbol either: we may take universal quantification as basic and use the 
old-fashioned ‘(​x​)’ style of notation (e.g. instead of ‘∀​x​F​x​’ write ‘(​x​)F​x​’). Thirdly, we may 
express identity by simply putting two terms together and adding brackets. (See the Appendix for 
a formal specification of the language just sketched.) Finally, in case anyone is tempted to count 
brackets as logical terms on the grounds that they are symbols whose significance is in some 
sense the same in all interpretations of the logical language, note that brackets may be avoided in 
a two-dimensional notation: instead of writing a left bracket, move up, and instead of writing a 
right bracket, move down. (The strategy of Polish notation, another well-known means of 
avoiding brackets, is unavailable in the present setting since we don’t have a connective to signal 
the beginning of our truth-functional compounds.) Similar two-dimensional techniques may be 
employed to permit more truth-functions, and the existential quantifier, to be taken as basic if 
desired. 
 
The eliminability of a symbol for identity is, I think, particularly instructive, since it suggests that 
at least some issues about logic’s scope could quite easily have arisen in a guise other than that 
of an issue about logical termhood. People have differed over whether the theory of identity is 
part of logic proper, with some maintaining that while first-order logic without identity is pure 
logic, first-order logic ​with​ identity is a first-order logical theory about a particular 
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subject-matter, namely identity.  Since we typically represent identity claims in formal languages 5
using a special symbol, ‘=’, this issue typically appears as an issue about logical termhood. But 
this could quite easily have been different. In English, we often express identity claims using ‘is’. 
And just as the ‘is’ of predication disappears upon logical regimentation, so too would the ‘is’ of 
identity if we did things slightly differently as described above. The issue of whether identity 
falls under logic’s scope then appears as an issue about whether to countenance a particular form 
of wff. 
 
Now, what does all this show? About the propositional logic case, Zinke draws the following 
moral: 
 
We are unable to classify a ​term​ as logical in a case like this, but this does not mean that 
there are no logical constants in a wider sense in such a language. In the language just 
described, a grammatical construction rule has to be characterized as logical. Strictly 
speaking, the problem of logical constants should therefore not be understood as 
restricted to drawing a line between the logical and the non-logical terms of the alphabet. 
(Zinke (2018), p. 134.) 
 
I take the point that if by ‘logical constants’ we just mean something like ‘logical features of the 
language’, then none of what we have seen above shows that we don’t need ​these​. But I think we 
should demur from extending the meaning of ‘logical constants’ in this way. In this connection, 
it is interesting to note that although in the phrase ‘logical constants’, the emphasis for present 
5 See Quine (1986, pp. 61 - 64) for discussion.  
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purposes is really on the ‘logical’ - ​logical​ constants as opposed to extra-logical ones - the 
connotation of the phrase easily shifts so that the emphasis falls on ‘constants’: logical ​constants 
as opposed to expressions in logical languages whose meanings vary. This shift also fits with the 
fact that ‘constant’ tends to be used in logic nowadays only for individual constants, and not in a 
way that would naturally cover connectives or quantifier symbols. Indeed, this terminology of 
‘logical constants’, euphonious and entrenched as it may be, has arguably been outdated ever 
since the ​Tractatus​, where, while so influentially rethinking the nature of formal logic, 
Wittgenstein declares that the so called ‘logical constants’ are not representatives.  6
 
Terminology aside, there is a deeper point that needs to be made here. Above, we eliminated 
symbols which, in the development of logical theories, normally and naturally get used - 
although in the case of identity, it seems as though it could have easily gone either way - in 
favour of an alternative way of accomplishing the same thing. This invites the thought that logic, 
while ​technically​ it could be done without logical terms, is for us human beings a matter of 
studying how our logical terms work. Something like this thought may be behind what Zinke 
goes on to say after the above-quoted passage: 
 
While it is important to keep this in mind, I will nevertheless continue to speak of the 
problem of logical constants and say that it focuses on drawing and justifying the line of 
6 See Wittgenstein (1922, §4.0312). From the point of view of our present concerns it is quite important that ‘logical 
constants’ appears in scare-quotes in this remark. While the ancestor of this remark in Wittgenstein’s early 
Notebooks​ (Wittgenstein (1969)) does not have the scare-quotes, the scare-quotes appear even in the notoriously 
buggy first edition, in German, of the ​Tractatus​, and persist in both the German and English texts of the 
Ogden-Richards edition (Wittgenstein (1922)), as well as the Pears-McGuiness translation (Wittgenstein (1961)). 
They do however tend to go missing when the remark is quoted - for instance in Biletzki & Matar (2018, §2.2) (the 
main ​SEP​ entry on Wittgenstein), Armstrong (2004, p. 54, f.n. 1), and Sellars (1962, p. 39). (Ironically, the title of 
Sellars' paper is 'Truth and "Correspondence"' - another significant use of scare-quotes!) 
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demarcation between the logical and the non-logical terms. This not only helps keep the 
discussion simple, it is also legitimate as far as one is solely concerned with natural 
language where we indeed have terms representing the logical notions. (Zinke (2018), pp. 
134 - 135.) 
 
In my view this is an unfortunate retreat, and the final thought above about how things are in 
natural language is importantly misguided. A good way to see this is to consider the case of 
adverbs. Consider the following natural language arguments: 
 
Deletion: 
Socrates is running quickly. 
Therefore, Socrates is running. 
 
Addition: 
Socrates is not running. 
Therefore, Socrates is not running quickly.  
 
Both arguments are necessarily truth-preserving. Furthermore, there seems to be a clear sense in 
which they are both necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of their forms. Their being necessarily 
truth-preserving does not turn on the specific meanings of ‘running’ and ‘quickly’, but rather has 
to do with the fact that ‘quickly’ belongs to a certain category of expressions - factive, or 
intersective, adverbs - all members of which can be deleted from atomic statements and added to 
negated atomic statements while preserving truth (among other inferential behaviours, such as 
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compounding and permutation). Indeed, such arguments are naturally formalised by augmenting 
first-order logic with an extra category of expressions  so that they get translated as follows: 7
 
Rs​q 
∴ Rs 
 
~Rs 
∴ ~Rs​q 
 
These arguments may then be determined to be necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of their 
forms. Some may think that logic should countenance such adverb-involving valid forms, while 
others may maintain either that the natural language arguments which motivate such a view are 
not formally valid after all, or that such arguments should be analyzed or regimented into 
non-adverb-involving valid forms. I am not taking a stand on this issue; the point is that here we 
have an issue about the scope of logic - about the range of valid forms it should countenance - 
which does not turn on which expressions are counted as logical constants. Rather, the issue in 
this case naturally occurs at the level of which grammatical categories and modes of composition 
should be included in (a) logic.  8
7 See my (ms.) for a development of this approach to the logic of adverbs, including a model-theoretic semantics and 
a sound and complete proof system. For an approach to handling the logic of adverbs with specially augmented 
languages see Thomason & Stalnaker (1973) and Pörn (1983). For an approach in which adverbs disappear on 
analysis or regimentation see Davidson (1967). 
8 ​Gareth Evans highlights the case of adverbs (and adjectives) in a related context: 
 
The validity of some inferences is said to be explained by reference to the meanings of the particular 
expressions occurring in them, while that of other inferences is due, rather, to the way in which the 
sentences are constructed out of their parts. The inference from ‘John knows that snow is white’ to ‘Snow 
is white’ is given as an example of the first type (...). The inferences from ‘John ran breathlessly’ to ‘John 
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We are now in a position to see what might be wrong with Zinke’s thought that, while strictly 
speaking it isn’t generally correct, to speak nevertheless as if the bounds of logic were a matter 
of the distinction between logical and extra-logical terms is ‘legitimate as far as one is solely 
ran’ and from ‘John is a large man’ to ‘John is a man’ may, tentatively, be taken to be examples of the 
second type. (Evans (1976), p. 49.) 
 
We might expect Evans to put the inference from ‘Snow is white and grass is green’ to ‘Snow is white’ in the former 
category, on the grounds that its validity may be explained by reference to the meaning of ‘and’. But Evans seeks to 
assimilate this with the second type. He continues: 
 
The distinction I have gestured towards is not without its intuitive appeal, and for many years philosophers 
have been trying to provide a basis for it in harmony with what they took to be its importance. The debate 
centred upon, and eventually ran aground upon, the problem of identifying a set of expressions as the 
logical constants. For if we are determined to say that the inference from ⌜​P​ and ​Q​⌝ to ​P​ is valid in virtue 
of structure, then the distinction between it and the detachment inference with ‘knows’ must reside in some 
difference between ‘knows’ and ‘and’. (Evans (1976), p. 49.) 
 
This sends Evans in search of a notion of ‘structurally valid inference’ under which fall the adverbial and 
‘and’-involving inferences, leaving the ‘knows’-involving inference on the non-structural side. Having such a notion 
may be all to the good, but from the present point of view, on which we are happy to say that many formally valid 
inferences turn on the meanings of particular expressions (albeit logical ones), Evans’s way of motivating his search 
runs together two distinctions which cross to yield four categories of deductive inferences: 
 
(i) Logical inferences which turn on the meanings of particular terms (e.g. from ‘Snow is white and grass is green’ 
to ‘Snow is white’). 
(ii) Logical inferences which do not so turn (e.g. from ‘Socrates ran quickly’ to ‘Socrates ran’ (perhaps), or from 
‘AB’ to ‘A’ in a logical notation where conjunctions are formed by putting conjuncts side-by-side). 
(iii) Extra-logical inferences which turn on the meanings of particular terms (e.g. from ‘John knows that snow is 
white’ to ‘Snow is white’). 
(iv) Extra-logical inferences which do not so turn (e.g. from ‘John ​Snow is white​’ to ‘Snow is white’ in a 
hypothetical language where knowledge attributions are made by writing a statement in italics next to someone’s 
name). 
 
Why did Evans write as if he wanted to find a principled way to avoid saying that the validity of instances of 
‘and’-elimination and the like ‘is to be explained by reference to the meanings of the particular expressions 
occurring in them’? We find a clue in an idea, derived from Davidson (1973, p. 81), which Evans pursues but finds 
difficulties with: that in a (broadly Davidsonian) theory of meaning, a word like ‘and’ is treated via a recursive 
clause rather than a base clause. We might say that ‘and’, so treated, is syncategorematic - i.e. that it does not have a 
meaning by itself. But that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have a meaning in a broad sense.  
 
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for making me aware of Evans (1976) and for a suggestion about how to think 
about it.) 
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concerned with natural language where we indeed have terms representing the logical notions’. 
The talk of ‘logical notions’ here rather stacks the deck against a case like that of adverbs, 
resulting in a subtle non sequitur. For aspects of logic that ​are​ naturally dealt with using logical 
terms, it is natural enough to talk of ‘notions’: the notion of identity, the notion of ​all​, the notion 
of ​or​, and so on. But with arguments like Addition and Deletion above, there is no analogous use 
of ‘notions’ which fits very well as a way of talking about what is responsible for their apparent 
validity. 
 
To sum up, the ubiquity of logical terms in the valid forms of standard logical theories is not an 
essential feature of formal logic. The work done by logical terms in some logical languages may 
in others be taken over by various aspects of syntax - categories of symbol, modes of 
composition of symbols, or even modes of appearance of symbols (italicization, writing upside 
down, or in different colours, etc.). In the case of identity it seems reasonable to think that this 
could quite easily have gone either way. Furthermore, the issue of how or whether (a) logic 
should accommodate a case like that of adverbs naturally occurs in such a way that no question 
arises about whether certain logical terms should be countenanced. Accordingly, philosophers of 
logic should beware of attaching too much (of the wrong kind of) importance to the notion of 
logical terms. 
 
Appendix: FOL without logical terms  9
 
Vocabulary: 
9 The style of presentation used here is modelled on that of Smith (2012, p. 280 and preceding), which uses a 
standard language involving logical terms. 
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Names: 
a, b, c, … t 
If we need more, we use subscripts (i.e. ​a​2​, ​a​3​, …, ​b​2​, ​b​3​, …). 
 
Variables: 
x, y, z, u, v, w 
As with names, we use subscripts if we need more. 
 
Predicates: 
A​1​, ​B​1​, ​C​1​, … , ​A​2​, ​B​2​, ​C​2​, …  
Superscripts indicate the number of argument places, and may be omitted for 
convenience. As with names and variables, we use subscripts if we need more.  
 
Brackets: 
(, ) 
 
Definition of ​term​: 
 
(i) Names are terms. 
(ii) Variables are terms, 
(iii) Nothing else is a term. 
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Wffs: 
 
(i) Where ​P​n​ is an ​n​-place predicate and ​t​1​… ​t​n​ are terms, the following is a wff:  
P​n​t​1​… ​t​n 
A wff of this kind is called an ​atomic​ wff. 
(ii) Where α and β are wffs, ​x​ is a variable, and ​t​ and ​u​ ​are terms, the following are wffs: 
(αβ) 
(​tu​) 
(​x​)α 
(iii) Nothing else is a wff. 
 
A model may be thought of as consisting of a domain D, a mapping from names to members of 
D (their ​referents​), and a mapping from ​n​-place predicates to (possibly empty) sets of ​n​-tuples 
(the predicates’ ​extensions​). 
 
Truth in a model M may then be defined as follows (for the quantification clause, we use α[​x​] to 
stand for an arbitrary wff with no free occurrence of any variable other than ​x​, and α[​a​/​x​] to stand 
for the wff resulting from α[​x​] by replacing all free occurrences of ​x​ in α[​x​] with the name ​a​): 
 
1. A wff ​P​n​ ​a​1​ . . . ​a​n​, where ​P​n​ is an ​n​-place predicate and ​a​1​… ​a​n​ are names, is true in M iff the 
ordered ​n​-tuple consisting of the referents in M of ​a​1​ through ​a​n​ in that order is in the extension 
of ​P​n​. 
2. A wff (​no​), where ​n​ and ​o​ are names, is true in M iff ​n​ and ​o​ have the same referent. 
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3. A wff (αβ), where α and β are wffs, is true in M iff α and β are both false in M. 
4. A wff ​(​x​)α[​x​] is true in M iff for every object ​o​ in the domain D of M, α[​a​/​x​] is true in M​a​o​, 
where ​a​ ​is some name not assigned a referent in M, and M​a​o ​is a model just like M except that in 
it the name ​a​ ​is assigned the referent ​o​. 
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